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I. INTRODUCTION 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was and continues to be controversial throughout the 
domestic and international community. With the matter of the subsequent US occupancy of Iraq 
aside, a deep divide exists among scholars in different fields as to the question of whether or not 
the US was justified in its initial decision to invade. Within the legal field, controversy surrounds 
the question as to whether the US could rightfully invade without explicit UN authorization. 
While, at the time of the invasion, a majority of Americans and their elected officials supported 
the action, moral scholars remained, and continue to remain, split on the justness of the action. 
Even those who used the same ethical framework of analysis, namely the just war theory, are 
split on the morality of the decision. Considering this disparity, it is helpful to analyze the 
situation according to John Finnis’ perception of the good, as established in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights. Following an application of the basic tenants of Finnis’ theory, its seems as 
though the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was a use of force necessary to ensure the 
continuation of justice in the international community.  
 
II. THE INVASION 
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded and successfully conquered Kuwait.
1
 Although this was 
not the first instance of contemporary Iraqi violence (the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s), it was the 
starting point of Iraq’s resistance to the United Nations (“UN”).2 The aggressive Iraqi behavior 
“alarmed” the UN Security Council, leading to its approval of Resolution 660, aimed to address 
                                                 
1
William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 THE 
AM. JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW 558 (2003). 
2
 Id. 
 2 
Iraq’s “breach of international peace and security.”3 This resolution condemned the Iraqi 
invasion, “demand[ing] that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces… 
[and] call[ed] upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the 
resolution of their differences.”4  
Despite the efforts of the Security Council, Iraq failed to comply with 660, leading to the 
adoption of Resolution 678 in November 1990.
5
 This statement declared that Iraq had until 
January 15, 1991 to implement Resolution 660 fully and authorized member states “to use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.”6 Despite these threats, 
Iraq continued to defy the UN, leading to the onset of Operation Desert Storm. A day after the 
Iraqi deadline was up, UN forces, led by the United States (“US”), launched a series of 
substantial air strikes and neutralized Iraqi air defenses. Ground forces subsequently moved in 
and quickly expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
7
 The conflict ended February 27, 1991.
8
 
In an attempt to end hostility and create peace in the region, the Security Council issued 
Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991.
9
  Resolution 687 called for a cease-fire and required Iraq to 
“unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless,” its weapons of mass 
destruction (biological, chemical, ballistic, and nuclear).
10
 The United Nations Special 
Commission (“UNSCOM”) was also setup under this resolution and was intended to be a 
                                                 
3
 S.C Res. 660 (U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). 
4
 Id. 
5
 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). 
6
 Id. 
7
 John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 THE AMER. JOURNAL OF INT’L 
LAW 564 (2003) 
8
 Id. 
9
 Taft, Buchwald, supra note 1, at 560. 
10
 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). 
 3 
weapons inspection agency in the country. Iraq accepted the terms of this resolution on the 6th of 
April and a formal cease-fire went into effect between all countries involved in the conflict.
11
 
The UN continued to adopt additional resolutions throughout the 1990s (e.g. Resolutions 
707 and 715), which repeatedly condemned Iraqi action, claiming that Iraq was “in serious 
violation of a number of its obligations under… Resolution 687 and [failing] to cooperate with 
[inspection agency requirements].”12 In 1997 the Security Council passed Resolution 1137, 
which, again, condemned Iraq’s repeated refusal to allow UNSCOM to effectively operate.13 It 
warned that if Iraq failed to “cooperate fully and immediately… [there would be] serious 
consequences.”14 Iraq agreed and resolved to fully comply by the end of October 1998.15 
Nonetheless, by December 1998, UNSCOM reported that it was not able to fulfill its mandate, 
due to Iraqi obstruction.
16
 Immediately, US and British forces launched a 70-hour bombing 
mission, known as Desert Fox.
17
 After the conflict had ended, Iraq prohibited any UNSCOM 
access into the country and, consequently, the UN disbanded UNSCOM in December 1999.
18
 
Tensions climaxed on the morning of September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda terrorists, with 
connections to Afghanistan, hijacked four US commercial passenger jets and successfully flew 
three of the aircraft into US buildings. The US responded with attacks directed towards 
Afghanistan and al Qaeda, and, while Iraq was not directly involved, the threat of future terrorist 
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 Yoo, supra note 6, at 564. 
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 See S.C. Res. 707, ¶ 1, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/707(1991). 
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 Yoo, supra note 6, at 565. 
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 Taft, Buchwald, supra note 1, at 560. 
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TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at 1; see also Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in 
Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 
115 (1999). 
18
 Taft, Buchwald, supra note 1, at 560. 
 
 4 
attacks led to a “sharper focus” on Iraq.19 The menacing possibility that terrorist groups could 
seek a safe haven in rogue nations with potential access to weapons of mass destruction 
(“WMDs”), such as Iraq, raised considerable security concerns in the US. In January 2002, 
President George W. Bush made this risk the focal point of his State of the Union Address, 
labeling North Korea, Iraq and Iran an “Axis of Evil.”20 The US warned that it would act to 
enforce existing resolutions and attempted to pressure the UN to adopt further resolutions that 
explicitly allowed military intervention.
21
 The UN responded on November 8, 2002 with the 
release of Resolution 1441. It found Iraq to be in “material breach of its obligations under 
relevant resolutions… [and] warned Iraq that it [would] face serious consequences as a result of 
its continued violations.” 22 
Although Resolution 1441 condemned Iraqi action, it did not explicitly call for military 
enforcement, and left the US demands somewhat unsatisfied.
23
 Rather than pushing for further 
resolutions, the US elected to use Resolution 1441 as legal justification for invasion.
24
 On March 
19, 2003 the US, leading an “ad hoc ‘coalition of the willing,’” invaded Iraq.25 Iraq was quickly 
defeated and on May 1, 2003, from the flight deck of the USS Lincoln, President Bush 
                                                 
19
 Yoo, supra note 6, at 565. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Christian Enemark & Christopher Michaelsen, Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq, 51 
AUST. JOURNAL OF POL. AND HIST. 554 (2004). 
22
 S.C. Res. 1441, ¶¶ 2, 13, U.N. SCOR. 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002). 
For background leading up to the resolution, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 956 (2002). 
23
 Id. 
24
 Enemark, Michaelsen, supra note 20, at 554. 
25
 Yoo, supra note 6, at 565. 
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announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended, signaling a transition to operations 
aimed at stabilizing and reconstructing the country.
26
 
 A total of 139 US troops were killed during the invasion and another 551 wounded.
27
 
These numbers are significantly smaller than other US conflicts. For example, in the Vietnam 
Conflict, another insurgency campaign, 58,220 US troops were killed and 304,000 wounded.
28
 
Similarly, in the Persian Gulf War, 383 US troops were killed and 776 were wounded.
29
 
Moreover, during the major combat operations it is estimated that roughly 3,230-4,327 Iraqi 
civilians were killed.
30
 This, too, is a much smaller number than in other US wars. For example, 
a single night of US firebombing over Tokyo in 1945 yielded, on average, at least 85,000 civilian 
casualties.
31
 Civilian casualties were also much smaller in the invasion of Iraq, when compared 
to previous insurgency campaigns. The Vietnam War, for instance, led to the death of 522,000 
civilians, a number 17–30 times larger than that in Iraq.32 In the Philippines, civilian deaths 
numbered around 200,000, which was roughly 11–17 times greater than the total in Iraq.33  
Although traditional combat capabilities were utilized, casualties were kept low in the 
2003 Iraq campaign mainly due to the use of sophisticated military technology. Using GPS-
guided all-weather bombs and infrared technology, US forces could see and strike Iraqi forces, 
                                                 
26
 Bush Makes Historic Speech Aboard Warship, CNN (May 1, 2003), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2003-05-01/us/bush.transcript_1_general-franks-major-combat-
allies?_s=PM:US 
27
 Iraq Coalition Casualties: Fatalities by Year and Month, 
http://icasualties.org/iraq/ByMonth.aspx  
28
 Anne Leland and Mari-Jana Oborocea, American War and Military Operations Casualties: 
Lists and Statistics, Cong. Res. Service, 2–3 (2010).  
29
 Id. 
30
 Colin H. Kahl, In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. 
Conduct in Iraq, 32 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 7–46 (2007). 
31
 Id. at 14.  
32
 Id. at 14. 
33
 Id. 
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despite their attempts to move at night or during sandstorms.
34
 Further, during the Iraq campaign, 
a heavy emphasis was placed on the use of surveillance, precision and communication. Satellites, 
airborne radar and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft were utilized to provide extremely detailed 
oversight of Iraq for every day of the campaign.
35
 Precision-guided missiles were employed to a 
greater extent than ever before, which enabled the US to strike specific targets without 
inadvertently hitting civilian centers.
36
 Communication in combat was “vast and elaborate,” 
which allowed the US to act quickly and effectively.
37
 As President Bush indicated, US forces 
focused on “striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s 
ability to wage war,” one of which, he noted, was “leadership targets.”38 The US also made the 
reduction of disproportionate damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure the focal point of 
their operations.
39
 “No-strike” lists were created that included schools, mosques, sensitive 
cultural sites, hospitals, water treatment facilities, power plants, and other elements of civilian 
infrastructure.
40
 As the campaign continued, additional items were added and the list eventually 
grew to include thousands of off-limit targets.
41
  
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Future of the U.S. Military, SABAN 
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2003). 
35
 Paul Cornish, Iraq, the Just War Tradition and the Mor, 20 ST. MARY’S CHURCH, 
CAMBRIGDE (2004). 
<http://www.ely.anglican.org/parishes/camgsm/sermons/S2004e/power_pc.html>. 
36
 Kahl, supra note 29, at 21. 
37
 Cornish, supra note 34.  
38
 Text of President Bush’s Address to the Nation, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 20, 2003) 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/20/news/war-text20 
39
 Kahl, supra note 29, at 16. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
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III. THE LEGAL DEBATE 
 Initially, the US intended to invade Iraq once it persuaded the Security Council to adopt 
an additional resolution that “[condemned] Iraq’s failure to comply with its disarmament 
obligations… [and] provide[d] implicit authorization for the use of force.”42 However, after 
Resolution 1441 was adopted, no further resolution was passed that permitted the use of force 
and, despite the lack of explicit authorization, the US invaded Iraq, claiming that it was operating 
under Resolution 678.
43
 The US maintained that, although Resolution 687 called for a cease-fire, 
it had been negated by Resolution 1441, which declared Iraq to be “in material breach of these 
earlier resolutions… [through] its continuing development of WMD programs, its support for 
terrorism, and its repression of the civilian population.”44 This material breach, according to the 
US, constituted a violation of the cease-fire, reestablished the relevancy of Resolution 678, and, 
in turn, legitimated the use of force. 
 The US specifically grounded its legal justification for unilateral action in paragraph 12 
of Resolution 1441. Paragraph 12 stated that if a breach were reported to the Security Council, 
the Security Council would assemble to assess to the inspector’s report, “in order to consider the 
situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to 
secure international peace and security.”45 The Security Council, according to the US, was 
required to “consider” the material breach but did not have to arrive at any conclusions regarding 
the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, the US argued that its 
unilateral action was warranted because the Security Council had met and agreed that Iraq was 
                                                 
42
 Joel H. Westra, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF ARMED FORCE: THE UN 
CHARTER AND THE MAJOR POWERS (2007), 126. 
43
 Yoo, supra note 6, at 567. 
44
 Id. 
45
 S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 21, emphasis added.  
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acting in defiance, even though the Council never formally voted to decide on a proper response. 
As John Negroponte, former US ambassador to the UN, suggested, “this resolution contains no 
‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force,” but insinuates that, after 
the Security Council had considered the violation, “the resolution did not constrain any Member 
State from acting… to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions.”46  
Although it was never formally offered as legal justification for unilateral action against 
Iraq, reference was made by several US officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, to 
invasion as being a form of preemptory strike.
47
 Under the Article 51 of the UN Charter, every 
state is allowed to exercise their inherent right to self-defense.
48
 This right can be utilized if an 
attack occurs against a member state and if it is subsequently reported to the Security Council.
49
 
Though an attack had not yet occurred, the US could have appealed to customary international 
law to justify the use of preemptive force and argued that the requirement that there be an actual 
attack was met due to the imminence of the threat. As a matter of established customary 
international law, preemptive self-defense is permissible when it passes the Caroline test.
50
 
According to this doctrine, preemption is legitimate if “the use of force [is] necessary because 
the threat is imminent and, thus, pursuing peaceful alternatives is not an option… [and] the 
                                                 
46
 Press Release SC/7564, THE UN. (Aug. 11, 2002) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm. 
47
 Powell Presents US Case To Security Council Of Iraq's Failure To Disarm, THE UN NEWS 
CENTRE (Feb. 5, 2003) 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=6079&Cr=iraq&Cr1=inspect&Kw1=1441&K
w2=Iraq&Kw3=. 
48
 U.N. Charter art. 51. The other exception to Article 2, paragraph 4 is Article 53, which permits 
the use of force if directly authorized by the United Nations Security Council. See U.N. Charter 
art. 53. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Yoo, supra note 6, at 571–2. 
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response must be proportionate to the threat.”51 In the case of Iraq, the Caroline test may have 
been met, and in turn the Article 51 requirements fulfilled, because Iraq had used chemical 
weapons against Iran and its own population, and was also preventing UN weapon inspectors 
from examining its weapon supply since 1990.
52
 Such a threat was intensified after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. These relatively successful assaults furthered the fear that “rogue nations,” such 
as Iraq, would harbor terrorist activities, possibly supplying them with more powerful means of 
force, i.e. WMDs.
53
 Given the availability of new weapons technology—weapons capable of 
being launched faster and farther than ever before—it may have been argued that it was no 
longer prudent for states to wait to be attacked before acting in self-defense and, thus, 
preemptory actions were justifiable.  
 In spite of the legal justification offered by the US for the invasion of Iraq, serious legal 
challenges were raised as to the legitimacy of the unilateral actions. Legal scholars, such as 
Thomas Franck, argued that the US was not a relevant party and had no ability to “determine that 
Iraq was in material breach.”54 The cease-fire was enacted by the UN as a whole and individual 
states had no right to determine whether Iraq was acting in compliance or not. Furthermore, 
Franck argues, the US was acting unlawfully because the Security Council had not explicitly 
permitted states to use unilateral discretion for the enforcement of relevant resolutions.
55
 
                                                 
51
 Yoo, supra note 6, at 572. 
52
 John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 765 (2004) 
53
 Yoo, supra note 6, at 574. 
54
 Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq, 97 THE AM 
JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW (2007). (Jan. 27, 2008) http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
9300%28200307%2997%3A3%3C607%3AWHNTUN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q. 
55
 Frank, supra note 51, at 612. 
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 Additionally, states such as France, Germany, and Russia contended that Resolution 678 
was no longer pertinent and that its “authorization had expired.”56 Despite the lack of explicit 
terms of resolution cessation, it was argued that 678 was exclusively pertinent to the “liberation 
of Kuwait and to restoring peace and security in the region.”57 Therefore, these states argued, 
because of the irrelevance of 678 in any matter other than the emancipation of Kuwait, 
Resolution 1441 was unable to resurrect any suggestion that 678 was applicable. Moreover, the 
People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and France also adopted a joint statement 
following the adoption of Resolution 1441, which declared that further resolutions were required 
for the use of force to be justified under the UN Charter.
58
 
 Similarly, such parties have further rejected any notion that the invasion of Iraq could be 
considered valid preemptive military action. Franck laments that, before 2003, uses of force, 
however lawful, were at least “accompanied by a fig leaf of justification… taken in response to 
an alleged prior attack or provocation.”59 However the invasion of Iraq, justified as preemptive 
self-defense, would be an indication that major powers have abandoned their commitment to this 
“fig leaf”.60 Any attempt to “stretch” the limitations of the use of force to include preemptive 
action, Franck argues, would be to disregard the Charter as a whole and provides a dangerous 
precedent of autonomous military action in the absence of an actual attack.
61
  
While it has been argued that ex-post developments are not relevant to the justification of 
force ex-ante, Richard Falk believes that the danger of preemptive action was clearly 
                                                 
56
 Yoo, supra note 6, at 567. 
57
 Frank, supra note 51, at 613. 
58
 Joint statement from the Popular Republic of China, the Federation of Russia, and France, 
UN.INT. (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/021108_cs_france_irak_2.htm 
59
 Frank, supra note 51, at 608. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
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demonstrated by the “failure… to find any evidence of weapons of mass destruction,” and the 
fact that no such weapons were used in defense against US invasion.
62
 He points out that it 
“seems reasonable to conclude that… such weaponry does not exist… [and because WMDs] 
were not used by Iraq to defend the survival of the regime it is highly unlikely that they would 
ever have been used in circumstances where an annihilating retaliation could be anticipated.”63 
Thus, according to Falk, the US invaded Iraq on false assumptions, further solidifying the 
illegitimacy and danger of preemptive self-defense.
64
 
 
IV. POLITICAL AND DOMESTIC PERCEPTION 
Despite the legal controversy surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the political and 
domestic spheres generally supported the decision. The majority of the head officials within the 
executive branch, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz favored action against Iraq, arguing that Iraq 
was a rogue nation that threatened US interests.
65
 Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, among others, however, initially favored a strategy of containment and expressed 
concerns about the need to invade Iraq.
66
 Ultimately it was agreed upon by members of the 
executive branch that a resort to war was necessary and should be based on Iraq’s possession of 
                                                 
62
 Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 THE 
AMER. JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW (2003).  
63
 Frank, supra note 51, at 610. 
64
 Id. 
65
 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Defense News Transcript, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with 
Sam Tannenhaus, VANITY FAIR, at http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-
depsecdef0223.html (May 9, 2003). In the interview, Wolfowitz asserts that within the U.S. 
government there were four “fundamental concerns” with respect to Iraq: (1) Iraq's possession of 
WMD; (2) Iraq's support for terrorism; (3) the possibility of WMD being supplied by Iraq to 
terrorists; and (4) Iraq's treatment of its own people. 
66
 Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 240 (2004) 
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WMDs.
67
 However, since WMDs were also possessed by other states at this time, this 
justification was bolstered by reference to Iraq’s failure to fulfill its disarmament obligations 
required by prior Security Council resolutions. 
Congressional support for the invasion was mixed. On October 2, 2002 the Iraq War 
Resolution was introduced in Congress.
68
 This joint resolution authorized military action because 
Iraq had “accumulated and used WMDs in the past against other nations and its own people, 
continued to violate UN Resolutions, demonstrated its continuing hostility toward the US, and 
provided aid to terrorist groups.”69 61% of Democratic members of the House voted against the 
resolution, while less than 3% of Republicans voted against it.
70
 Meanwhile, 42% of Democratic 
Senators voted against the resolution and 2% of Republican Senators voted against it.
71
 Most of 
those opposed based their concerns not on the fact that the Iraqi regime was not dangerous, but 
that the resolution placed too much power into the President’s hands.72 Despite the higher 
number of Democrats in opposition to the bill, many prominent members of the party supported 
the invasion, including House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, current Vice President Joe 
Biden and current Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
73
 Several Senators and Representatives 
attempted to amend the resolution to take additional measures, such as providing a termination 
                                                 
67
 U.S. Dep't of Defense News Transcript, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam 
Tannenhaus, VANITY FAIR, at http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-
depsecdef0223.html (May 9, 2003).  
68
 Authorization For Use Of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution Of 2002, PL 107–243, 
October 16, 2002, 116 Stat 1498. 
69
 Id.  
70
 Alison Mitchell & Carl Hulse, Threats And Responses: The Vote; Congress Authorizes Bush 
To Use Force Against Iraq, Creating A Broad Mandate (Oct. 11, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/11/us/threats-responses-vote-congress-authorizes-bush-use-
force-against-iraq-creating.html. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
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date for the authorization of the use of armed forces (i.e. the Byrd Amendment) or to obtain 
additional resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, however such attempts were not 
successful.
74
 The bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 296 to 133, passed the 
Senate by a vote of 77 to 23, and was signed into law on October 16, 2002.
75
 
American public opinion showed general support for invasion but also indicated a belief 
that the US should wait for further Security Council regulations before resorting to war. Seven 
months before the September 11 terrorist attacks, a Gallup poll confirmed that 52% of 
Americans would favor an invasion, while 42% would opposite it.
76
 Further, 64% believed that 
the US should have dismantled the Hussein regime at the end of the 1991 Gulf War.
77
 In 
February 2003, another public opinion poll showed that 59% of Americans believed that the UN 
should have more time to conduct weapons inspections in Iraq and 56% indicated that the US 
should wait for Security Council authorization.
78
 Weeks before the March 2003 invasion, 71% of 
Americans were found to believe that the decision to use force was the right one, yet that number 
dropped to 56% in support for a military invasion if the Security Council were to reject a 
resolution calling for military action.
79
 Even after the beginning of military operations in Iraq, an 
ABC News/Washington Post poll showed a 62% support for the war.
80
 
                                                 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Iraq, The Gallup Poll, GALLUP/CNN/USA TODAY,(Feb. 2001) 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/Iraq.aspx#4. 
77
 Id. 
78
 See Patrick E. Tyler & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Most in U.S. Support Delaying a War, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at A1 (reporting on a New York Times/CBS news poll based on random 
interviews with adults throughout the United States). 
79
 See Scott Keeter, Trends in Public Opinion About the War in Iraq, 2003-2007, (Mar. 15, 2007) 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/431/trends-in-public-opinion-about-the-war-in-iraq-2003-2007. See 
also Richard Benedetto, Poll: Most Back War, But Want U.N. Support,  
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-03-16-poll-iraq_x.htm. 
80
 Iraq, CNN/ORC POLL (Dec. 16–18, 2003), http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm. 
 14 
 
V. THE MORAL DEBATE 
 Outside of the legal and political communities, the decision to invade Iraq was hotly 
debated as a moral issue as well. Many of those in support of the invasion and those opposing it 
made their moral case based upon the tenants of the just war tradition. Although this theory dates 
back to the likes of Aristotle, Cicero, and Augustine, it has been extremely influential in shaping 
the moral debate concerning the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 According to the just war theory, a series of criteria must be met in order for there to be a 
just resort to war, or a jus ad bellum. Although various scholars have added or withdrawn various 
standards from this list, it is generally agreed that a state must fulfill these six requirements: just 
cause, right intention, right authority, last resort, proportionality, and reasonable chance of 
success. The first two requirements necessitate that there be a just cause and a right intention in 
the decision to use force.
81
 According to Hugo Grotius, widely considered to be the “father of 
international law” and a major just war theorist, in order to sufficiently meet these requirements, 
the resort to war must be “rooted in the right of self-defense.”82 Wars must be waged to obtain a 
contested right, not to “show power or punish evil men.”83 These requirements extend to 
preemptive attack if the threat is “immediate and imminent.”84 Grotius further limits preemption 
and asserts that: 
If a man is not planning an immediate attack, but it was been ascertained that he has 
formed a plot, or is preparing and ambuscade, or that he is putting poison in our way… I 
maintain that he cannot be lawfully killed, either if the danger can in any way be avoided, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
81
 James T. Johnson, MORALITY AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE, 53 (1999). 
82
 Id. 
83
 Westra, supra note 41, at 43. 
84
 Grotius, Hugo. THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE. Trans. Francis W. Kelsey, 1925, II.I.V. 
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or if it is not altogether certain that the danger cannot be otherwise avoided… the delay 
that will intervene affords opportunity to apply many remedies.
85
 
 
Just wars must also be waged by the right, or legitimate, authority, which stems from a 
sovereign political entity. “The subject of sovereignty is the state and not in any particular 
person,” as its status, responsibilities, and power are independent from the governing persons.86 
Yet Grotius notes that a state’s sovereign power originates from its people.87 Their collective 
right of self-protection is represented by the state, which in turn in represented by the sovereign 
authority. 
The decision to go to war also must be the state’s last resort; after all non-violent options 
have been exhausted. Further, it must be proportionate to the intended goals. Such goals must 
also be limited and must have a reasonable chance of success. Grotius argues that war should not 
be considered as the first option in response to a threat.
88
 War is just if it “presents an appropriate 
means to reach a legitimate aim.”89 Such a calculation involves weighing the universal goods 
expected against the universal evils expected. Only if the goods are proportionate to the costs 
will the resort to force be considered just. War cannot be justified if, when making the initial 
decision to use force, it will have no measureable impact on the situation. There must be a 
“reasonable chance of success in bringing about a more just peace than existed previously… to 
wage war in the certain knowledge that the damage caused will be in vain is unjust.”90 
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On October 3, 2002, many of the most prominent evangelical Christian leaders sent a 
letter, known as the “Land Letter” (herein after “the Letter”) to President Bush, outlining their 
support for the invasion. These leaders included Richard D. Land, president of the Ethics and 
Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, Chuck Colson, founder of 
Prison Fellowship Ministries, and Carl D. Herbster, president of the American Association of 
Christian Schools. In the course of the Letter, these religious leaders laid out their reasons for 
supporting the invasion, based on the tenants of the just war theory. 
As to the just cause requirement, the Letter argued, “using military force… to disarm 
Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction is a just cause.”91 The Letter reasoned that 
such force would be necessarily a defensive measure because Hussein violated jus cogen norms 
(i.e. fundamental principles of international law from which no derogation is ever permitted), as 
he “attacked his neighbors, used weapons of mass destruction against his own people, and 
harbored terrorists from the al Qaeda terrorist network that attacked our nation so viciously and 
violently on September 11, 2001.”92 Similarly, as to just intent, the Letter indicated that “[o]ur 
nation does not intend to destroy, conquer, or exploit Iraq.”93 
The leaders further argued that this war would adequately be commenced as a last resort, 
as “[t]he world has been waiting for more than a decade for the Iraqi regime to fulfill its 
agreement to destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction, to cease producing them or the long-
range missiles to deliver them in the future, and to allow thorough and rigorous inspections to 
verify their compliance.”94 Hussein, they argued, has been given ample opportunity to fulfill his 
obligations after numerous UN sanctions and condemnations, however, “he stands convicted by 
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his own record as a brutal dictator who cannot be trusted to abide by any agreement he makes.”95 
Therefore, given the history of ineffective sanctions and UN condemnations, the Letter argued 
that the decision to invade could justifiably be considered the last resort.  
The Letter also commended the decision to bring the matter before both the UN General 
Assembly and Security Council. Yet it argued, “as American citizens we believe that, however 
helpful a U.N. Security Council vote might be, the legitimate authority to authorize the use of 
U.S. military force is the government of the United States and that the authorizing vehicle is a 
declaration of war or a joint resolution of the Congress.”96 Thus, it was argued that the 
requirement of authorization by a legitimate authority was also met in this case. 
Lastly, as to the requirements of a reasonable expectation of success and proportionality, 
the Letter stated: “we believe your stated policies for disarming the murderous Iraqi dictator and 
destroying his weapons of mass destruction, while liberating the Iraqi people for his cruel and 
barbarous grip, more than meet those criteria.” It argued further that “the cost of not dealing with 
this threat now will only succeed in greatly increasing the cost in human lives and suffering 
when an even more heavily armed and dangerous Saddam Hussein must be confronted at some 
date in the not too distant future.”97 
Conversely, more than 100 Christian ethicists released a statement in opposition to a war 
with Iraq, which simply stated: “As Christian ethicists we share a common moral presumption 
against a preemptive war on Iraq by the United States.”98 Many also opposed the war based on 
the tenants of the just war tradition.  
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As to the requirements of just cause and intent, critics argued that the invasion failed to 
adequately limit force to cases of defense against aggression. Though it was not the official basis 
offered by the Bush administration for the invasion, the argument for preemptive use of force 
was perceived to be troubling.
99
 Such a use of force is only permissible on occasion; in instances 
“where there is a clear and present danger, or a grave and imminent threat.”100 However, critics 
submitted that the US started down a slippery slope as it “has taken this concept and used it to 
deal not just with imminent threats, but with merely potential or gathering dangers.”101 As to 
another informal argument for the invasion, namely Iraq’s link to terrorism, critics argued that 
“[t]here would be a just cause to use force against Iraq if there was clear and adequate evidence 
of Iraqi involvement in the attacks of September 11.”102 This, they argued, would be an act of 
self-defense and would be justifiable. However, “[g]iven that al Qaeda is estimated to operate in 
sixty countries, military action to overthrow the regime… would have to be based on evidence of 
substantial support.”103 Such substantial support, however, was not produced. Critics further 
argued, “[t]hat the Coalition had Right Intention in invading Iraq is, at best, open to question.”104 
The “US depends heavily on imported oil… and the Middle East is home to the world’s richest 
oil resources,” thus it may be argued that the intention to go to war was shaped by economic 
interests, an act clearly in violation of jus cogen norms prohibiting wars of aggression and 
territorial aggrandizement. Moreover, other critics also suggested that the invasion might have 
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been primarily motivated by a desire to remove the Hussein regime from power, rather than to 
enforce the Security Council provisions.
105
 
In reference to right authority, critics argued that the proper framework for considering 
the use of force was within that of the UN.
106
 Despite the legal arguments surrounding whether 
the US-led coalition was actually justified under existing Security Council resolutions, opponents 
argued that without explicit authorization, the invasion was not initiated under legitimate 
authority.
107
 Moreover, critics argued that that further sanctions would have been more 
appropriate, as they “provide[] necessary checks and balances, especially given the troubling 
precedent involved in the world’s only superpower proposing to use preventive force to 
overthrow other regimes,” and ensure greater support from the regional and international 
community.
108
 Others, however, argued that all sanctions should have been removed and no 
force should have been used in order to alleviate human suffering. Such critics argued:  
“[t]he humanitarian situation inside Iraq at the time was not so dire that military 
intervention was the only way to forestall large-scale loss of life. If anything, the most 
obvious measure short of war to alleviate human suffering in Iraq would have been to 
remove the UN sanctions imposed twelve years previously.”109 
 
Finally, it was argued that, though not taking military action could have negative 
consequences, invading Iraq could have “unpredictable consequences not only for Iraq but peace 
and stability elsewhere in the Middle East."
110
 Given this uncertainty, critics believed that the 
probability of success criterion was not met. Moreover, they argued that “the attack is in no way 
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proportional to the perceived original aggression of Saddam Hussein. Innocent civilians… will 
not be protected.”111  
Like the debate amongst the legal community, scholars of ethics and morality continue to 
debate the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. An ex-post analysis proves that Iraq was, in fact, not 
found to be in possession of WMDs. Conversely, Hussein clearly committed massive human 
rights violations, some of which may have continued had the US not intervened. In spite of these 
facts and despite using the same moral framework, namely the just war theory, these scholars 
continue to remain deeply divided. 
 
VI. FINNIS, PRACTICAL REASONABLENESS AND THE INVASION 
 Given the controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq, it is helpful to look to legal 
philosopher John Finnis’ work, Natural Law and Natural Rights for guidance. In this book, 
Finnis presents his view of the theory of natural law and, in doing so, presents several basic 
principles with which individuals can use to properly understand any problems of ethics, politics, 
and jurisprudence. This theory, then, provides a sound framework with which one may assess the 
2003 invasion. 
 Finnis begins his work with a discussion of the good. According to Finnis, there are 
objective values that human beings must promote in order to have a fulfilling life.
112
 An 
understanding of these values allows one to formulate principles of action that help to pursue the 
good. There are seven of these equally fundamental, irreducible and self-evident values.
113
 Each 
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of these universal goods are intrinsically valuable and their pursuit exhausts the ultimate reasons 
one could have for action.
114
 
 The first of these values is what Finnis terms “knowledge of the truth.”115 Truth, 
according to Finnis, is a basic value and knowledge of the truth, therefore, is worth pursuing for 
its own sake rather than “knowledge sought only instrumentally.”116 Knowledge is a good 
because pursuit of knowledge “makes intelligible… any particular instance of the human activity 
and commitment involved in such pursuit.”117 Knowledge, then, is something good to have as it 
serves to “orient one’s practical reasoning.”118 After his discussion of knowledge Finnis moves 
on to discuss life, the second objective value. This basic value “signifies every aspect of the 
vitality which puts a human being in good shape for self-determination.”119 Life, therefore, 
includes every facet of human existence that enables one to determine their own fate; including 
issues such as security and health. Finnis next considers the basic values of play (i.e. actions 
“which have no point beyond the performance itself… [and are] enjoyed for their own sake), 
aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship) and religion.
120
 All of these, according to Finnis, are 
necessary for the full flourishing of each individual.
121
 The seventh basic good is “practical 
reasonableness” and refers to the ability to “bring one’s own intelligence to bear effectively… on 
the problems of choosing one’s actions and lifestyle and shaping one’s own character.”122  
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 In order to sufficiently obtain the basic good of practical reasonableness, one must meet 
its nine requirements. The first and second require that one form a coherent life plan and 
recognize the importance of each of the basic seven values, in which one must not arbitrarily 
prefer one over another.
123
 Third, Finnis argues that one must demonstrate impartiality amongst 
persons because “the basic goods are human goods, and can in principle be pursued, realized, 
and participated in by any human being.”124 The fourth and fifth requirements of practical 
reasonableness are “closely complementary” and require that one has a “certain detachment from 
all the specific and limited projects which one undertakes,” but, despite this detachment, one 
must “not abandon them lightly.”125 Sixth, one must “bring about good in the world… by actions 
that are efficient for their purposes.”126 Finnis argues that one must not be wasteful in the 
methods used to achieve such ends and that one’s acts “should be judged… by their fitness for 
their purpose.”127 Finnis’ seventh requirement of practical reasonableness holds that one should 
not do any action which does nothing but damage any one of the seven basic forms of human 
good.
128
 Relatedly, one must also foster the common good of one’s community.129 Lastly, Finnis 
holds that one must refrain from acting as one believes one ought not to act. In other words, one 
must follow one’s conscience.130 In order to pursue one’s own good successfully, one must 
satisfy these requirements. Further, the attempt to satisfy them, leads one to pursue the good of 
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others, or the common good. Consequently, as Finnis points out, the product of these 
requirements of practical reasonableness is morality.
131
 
 In his work, Finnis takes these basic principles and applies them to issues of justice and 
law, among others. Justice concerns the requirements of practical reasonableness in one’s 
relationships with others. Justice, Finnis argues, requires that one “foster and favor the common 
good of one’s communities.”132 The common good of one’s community, including the 
international community, entails establishing the conditions required for the full flourishing of all 
members of the community. This includes the protection of human rights (or the good of each 
member individually), an exercise of authority in a way that adheres to the requirements of 
practical reasonableness, and the need for law to resolve issues with the implementation of 
justice.
133
 Justice is, therefore, “other directed, concerns the duty to act according to practical 
reasonableness and [concerns] equality of proportionality.”134 According to Finnis, there are two 
forms of justice, commutative justice and distributive justice. Distributive justice concerns 
relations between the individual and the community.
135
 It requires that one’s “common stock” or 
natural resources, products from natural resources, and incidents of communal enterprises be 
appropriated by individuals for the common good.
136
 Commutative justice concerns “relations 
and dealings between persons.”137 It deals with duties owed to ascertained and unascertained 
persons, to governing officials and to governing officials’ subjects.138 
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 Finnis argues that the authority of law depends upon its justice or its ability to secure 
justice.
139
 However “in this world, as it is, justice may need to be secured by force.”140 Yet, a 
system of law is more than a set of prohibitions and punishments, it is “a certain form or quality 
of communal life, in which the demands of the common good are unambiguously and insistently 
preferred… [and] each is enabled to conduct his life… with a clear knowledge and 
foreknowledge of the appropriate common way and of the cost of deviation from it.”141 There is, 
of course, a need for the recalcitrant “to be given palpable incentive to abide by the law when 
appeals to the reasonableness of sustaining the common good fail to move.”142 Certain types of 
punishment, then, are required to avoid injustice and to maintain common good.
143
 Finnis writes: 
“When someone, who really could have chosen otherwise, manifests in action a 
preference… for his own interests, his own freedom of choice and action, as against the 
common interests and the legally defined common way-of-action, then in and by that 
very action he gains a certain sort of advantage over those who have restrained 
themselves, restricted their pursuit of their own interests in order to abide by the law.”144  
 
Justice, therefore, requires that such advantage is reversed and punishment is required to avoid 
injustice.
145
 Inadequate or nonexistent punishment of wrongdoers must be avoided, as Finnis 
points out that “failure to attempt to resist by force the depredations of invaders, pirates, and 
recalcitrant will normally be a failure in justice.”146  
 Finnis argues that justice on occasion necessitates punishment, or the use of force, in 
order to ensure the common good. Such was the argument used by the US in its decision to 
invade Iraq. Given its history of brutal crimes against humanity and its persistent failure to 
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comply with the requirements of multiple Security Council resolutions, the Hussein regime 
needed what Finnis refers to as “palpable incentive to abide by the law.”147 Iraq was 
continuously given the opportunity to choose otherwise, however it continually took advantage 
of such opportunities and decided not to restrict the pursuit of its own interests in order to abide 
by international law. Therefore, it seems clear that justice did require that Iraq be punished, due 
to its violations of stated law. However, what is no so immediately clear is whether the US 
decision to enforce such punishment was in accordance with Finnis’ theory. 
 In order to adequately analyze the 2003 invasion of Iraq, according to Finnis’ theory, one 
must apply his seven universal values to the situation. As mentioned, Finnis’ analysis begins 
with the knowledge of the truth and moves on into a discussion of life as a universal good.
148
 
Every actor, whether the actor is an individual or a state, must pursue knowledge and use it to 
orient its actions.
149
 Further, the actor must aim to promote vitality in its actions, both vitality of 
the actor and the actor’s community.150 As history has made clear, the US was working with 
limited knowledge it its decision to invade Iraq. Despite its eventually disproven belief that Iraq 
had stockpiled WMDs, the US did accurately consider Iraq to be in violation of numerous 
Security Council resolutions. Given this knowledge, the US was able to offer an explanation for 
its decision to invade. In other words, its seems as though this knowledge was used to “make 
intelligible… [a] particular instance of human activity.”151 Therefore, it seems as though the US 
had fulfilled the first requirement of Finnis’ list of universal values. Further, although there is 
debate as to the exact reason for the US’s decision to invade Iraq, the US officially based its 
                                                 
147
 Id. at 262. 
148
 Id. at 60, 86. 
149
 Id. at 61. 
150
 Id. at 86. 
151
 Id. at 62.  
 26 
decision to invade on its interest in preserving human life. Though it seems counterintuitive to 
argue that engaging in combat is necessary to preserve human life, Iraq did have a history of 
egregious human rights violations and, with this in mind, its posture, displayed through its 
resistance to UN weapons inspection attempts suggested that it had WMDs. Iraq had used 
WMDs, namely chemical weapons against the Kurds.
152
 Further, it was suspected the Iraq was 
supplying WMDs to terrorist groups, one of which had successfully attacked the US on 
September 11.
153
 Even though an ex-post analysis shows that Iraq did not, in fact, possess 
WMDs, with the knowledge that the US, as well as the rest of the international community, had, 
it seems reasonable to intervene and ensure the protection of human life, both for those in the 
Middle East region, in the US, and elsewhere. 
 While Finnis’ analysis of play, aesthetic experience, sociability and religion do not 
necessarily apply directly to the invasion, practical reasonableness does. In order to determine 
whether the US fulfilled this requirement, an analysis must be made of its nine sub-parts. 
Practical reasonableness demands that every actor have a rational life plan rather than “liv[ing] 
from moment to moment, following immediate cravings, ” and must also avoid arbitrarily 
preferring certain values to others.
154
 Although this does not neatly apply to the situation in 2003, 
it does indicate that thought must be put into one’s actions in order to ensure that one is 
following Finnis’ fundamental values. It appears as though the US and its allies did put serious 
thought into the decision to invade. As noted above, debate about the invasion occurred at many 
levels. This had been a serious issue among the international community for over a decade and 
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had been discussed heavily in the UN.
155
 Debate occurred domestically within the government 
and, within the polis, legal and moral leaders debated its justification. Finally, an official vote 
was taken, in which both the Senate and House agreed to take action, a decision that the 
president approved. Given the discussion surrounding this decision, it is clear that the matter was 
not taken lightly but as a serious measure worthy of substantial deliberation. Consequently it 
appears as though Finnis’ requirements, that one conduct oneself rationally and without arbitrary 
preferences among the goods, have been met. 
 Finnis also requires impartiality amongst persons to ensure the common good. Though 
one will reasonably have a certain sense of self-preference, one must avoid one’s selfish desires 
that are pursued at the cost of others.
156
 Every fundamental value is at stake in the resort to arms. 
The ability to attain each value is lost as one takes another’s life or forces them into a warzone. 
Therefore, when considering whether or not to go to war, one must ensure that one is not 
arbitrarily giving preference for one’s own good over the community’s. As stated above, the 
fulfillment of this standard depends on the US’s reason for invasion. And, while many argue that 
other factors were at play in its decision, one’s analysis must be restricted to a justification based 
on the enforcement of Security Council resolutions, as it is the only official explanation given. 
An invasion based on economic or other selfish motives would undoubtedly not suffice to fulfill 
this requirement. However, an invasion based on the need to enforce Security Council 
resolutions, which were established to protect human life, and potentially one based on 
preemptive necessity, seems to meet this standard. The US, in invading for this reason, risked its 
own security in order to protect itself, those in the region, and the wider international 
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community. The decision to go to war, in essence, must be analyzed in accordance with the 
doctrine of double effect. A certain just act may have a secondary effect, that alone would not be 
morally permissible, so long as it is the byproduct of bringing about a primary act that is itself 
morally just.
157
 The four-fold conditions of double effect require that the action be morally good 
or indifferent, that the bad effect not be the means by which one achieves the good effect, that 
the primary intent be to secure the primary good, and that the good effect outweigh the bad.
158
 
The US’s decision to use force had the primary effect of enforcing UN Security Council 
resolutions and promoting a good in which its own security, as well as the security of those in the 
region and others internationally, was protected. Though the destruction of life was a byproduct 
of the decision to invade, it was not the means through which security was ensured. Rather, the 
primary good of ensuring security was obtained by enforcing UN Security Council resolutions 
through the removal of the Hussein regime from a place of power within Iraq. Further, the US’s 
primary intent was to ensure security and enforce UN Security Resolutions through regime 
change, rather than merely the destruction of life or any other wrongfully motivated act. Lastly, 
the good of acting to secure one’s own and many others’ security is a good that outweighs the 
destruction of an enemy that actively endangered them. As Finnis points out, justice requires that 
the advantage one gains by violating the law be reversed, as one loses their right to certain goods 
and must be punished due to such a violation.
159
 This decision to go to war, then, can be 
justifiably taken, even though its double effect was that it entailed the slaying of the aggressor 
(i.e. the Hussein regime), because of good end it primarily promoted. Given the ultimate good 
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pursued in its decision to use force, the US can be considered to have met Finnis’ principle as it 
displayed impartiality amongst persons to ensure the common good.  
 According to Finnis, a balance must be found in one’s endeavors. Practical 
reasonableness requires detachment, to a certain extent, from one’s projects, yet one must not 
“abandon them lightly.”160 Such an attitude is vital for insurgency campaigns, as the appropriate 
use of force is required so that one may avoid becoming indefinitely entangled in combat and, 
conversely, so that one does not take the matter lightly. While the US certainly found itself 
entangled in the situation in Iraq for an extended period of time in its attempt to stabilize the 
state, its initial invasion only lasted two months.
161
 Using state-of-the-art military technology, the 
US was able to quickly defeat the Hussein regime and complete the primary objective of the 
invasion. Though the decision to occupy Iraq, after the invasion, and ensure its internal stability 
requires further analysis, the initial invasion was so brief that it did not necessitate any 
deliberation as to whether or not the US should abandon the attack. It seems, therefore, that this 
standard was relatively easily met in the US’s 2003 invasion.  
 Similarly, Finnis demands that one bring about good in the world efficiently and within 
reason.
162
 Certainly, the US invasion met this requirement, as it was able to quickly and 
effectively conclude its objective successfully. As previously noted, the US used advanced 
military technology, such as GPS-guided all-weather bombs, infrared technology, and unmanned 
reconnaissance aircraft, among others, to resolve the conflict quickly and with minimal civilian 
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casualties.
163
 Such efficiency is further demonstrated when the Iraq campaign is compared to 
similar campaigns, as demonstrated above.
164
 
 Practical reasonableness, according to Finnis, also requires that one refrain from acting in 
a way that damages any of the other forms of human good but, instead, fosters the common 
good.
165
 As stated above, every fundamental form of human good is at stake when one goes to 
war. The attainment and use of knowledge, life, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, religion, 
and practical reasonableness may be lost in the resort to force. This is, then, a weighty decision 
and one must ensure that the common good is promoted. In a certain sense, the 2003 invasion 
was carried out in a way that damaged the good of certain individuals in the Hussein regime. 
However, Finnis argues that when one, who has been given the choice to do otherwise, 
consciously chooses to violate the law, one is no longer entitled to certain goods and punishment 
is required to avoid injustice.
166
 The US, in its invasion of Iraq, worked toward the common 
good of the international community in its punishment of a known recalcitrant. Not only had the 
Hussein regime consistently failed to fulfill its obligations under international law, it also 
committed abominable violations of human rights by using chemical weapons against its own 
population.
167
 
 Finally, Finnis argues that practical reasonableness demands that one follow one’s 
conscience.
168
 Again, if the invasion was motivated by economic or other selfish motives, the US 
may have not met this standard as Finnis envisages it. However, according to the official position 
taken, it does seem as though the US was following its collective conscience. Given the 
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widespread support of the polis before and even during the invasion, it appears as though this 
element is satisfied. While the fact than an even greater majority supported the invasion, had the 
US received explicit authorization by the UN, a majority supported the invasion without it.
169
 
Further, the decision was voted on and approved by the Senate, the House, and the President. 
This indicates that Americans generally believed that the invasion was the right course of action, 
given the Hussein regime’s past action. Thus, in its invasion, it appears as though the US was 
acting in accordance with its collective conscience and, therefore, can be considered to have 
fulfilled the last requirement of practical reasonableness.  
 Justice required that Iraq be punished, as it had violated international law, in its failure to 
comply with multiple Security Council resolutions and in its abuse of human rights. A failure to 
use force and punish the regime would have resulted in injustice and a breakdown of 
international law. The US, however, fulfilled a duty required under commutative justice in its 
decision to invade Iraq. Not only was Iraq in need of a “palpable incentive to abide by the law,” 
but the US also met the standards necessary in order for the invasion to be considered just under 
Finnis’ theory of the good. The invasion met each applicable universal good, as well as the 
standards required for it sufficient in terms of Finnis’ conception of practical reasonableness. 
Considering the fact that justice required that Iraq be punished and that the US acted in 
accordance with the Finnis’ universal values, it appears as though the invasion would have been 
acceptable under the framework of Finnis’ theory of practical reasonableness. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 As has been shown, controversy surrounds the US’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. 
Despite a general consensus at the outset of the invasion and despite the fact that it was generally 
agreed that Iraq had, on multiple occasions, severely violated international law, debates raged 
among legal and moral scholars. Even the application of a moral framework based on the just 
war theory has yielded diverse opinions on the US’s justification for action. However, as has 
been demonstrated, the US invasion was justifiable under Finnis’ theory of practicable 
reasonableness, as found in Natural Law and Natural Rights. A formal analysis based on the 
application of Finnis’ universal values and his conception of justice indicates that the US was 
justified in its decision to invade. Though it will clearly not end the debate surrounding the 
invasion, Finnis’ theory provides a useful framework for analysis and shows that the US decision 
to invade Iraq in 2003 was a use of force necessary to ensure the continuation of justice in the 
international community. 
 
